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Batson: Administrative Expenses of Trusts: What Did Congress Mean

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF TRUSTS:
WHAT DID CONGRESS MEAN?

1.

INTRODUCTION

When the United States Supreme Court recently decided Knight v.
Commissioner,' it resolved an issue that has divided Circuit Courts of Appeal2 :
should the investment advisory fees incurred by trusts and estates receive
preferential treatment as compared to the same fees incurred by individuals? The
Court answered, generally, no.3 The issue turns on the interpretation of § 67 of the
Internal Revenue Code.4 Section 67(a) imposes a general restriction on
"miscellaneous itemized deductions," a category that includes investment advisory
fees incurred by individuals! The amount of such deductions is reduced by two
percent of adjusted gross income.6 Section 67 generally treats trusts and estates the
same as individuals in computing adjusted gross income, such that investment
advisory fees are not generally deductible unless they exceed the two-percent floor.
However, § 67(e)(1) creates an exception for expenses paid or incurred in
connection with the administration of a trust or estate that "would not have been
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate."' The interpretation of
this exception is particularly important to large trusts that incur sizeable investment
advisory fees, and hence, the exception has generated significant commentary
among estate planners. A number of courts have litigated the issue, with Circuit
Courts of Appeal being divided both in result and analysis.
This Note examines the Court's decision in light of the taxpayer's arguments
and the government's arguments regarding the interpretation of § 67(e). Part II
explains the statutory scheme. Part III discusses in depth the background of § 67(e),
Congress's general goals when enacting the statute, and the proposed
interpretations of congressional intent. Part IV examines the proposed
interpretations of the statute and the approach adopted by the Supreme Court. Part

1. 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008). For purposes of clarity, this Note will refer to the instant case as Knight
v.Commissioner (or some conspicuous variation thereof) as this was the caption of the case just
decided. However, while en route to the Supreme Court, the case was captioned as William L. Rudkin
Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner. 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006). At times this Note will refer to the
lower court's treatment of the case, yet in the text, this Note will continue to refer to the case as Knight
v.Commissioner.
2. See infra notes 59 64 and accompanying text.
3. See Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 791.
4. I.R.C. § 67 (2000).
5. See id.
§ 212 (providing a deduction for expenses incurred "for the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the production of income," which includes fees incurred for
investment advice); id. § 67(b) (providing that deductions under § 212 are miscellaneous itemized
deductions).

6. I.R.C. § 67(a).
7. Id. § 67(e).
8. Id. § 67(e)(1).
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V examines the practical ramifications of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute, considering the nature of the trust and the effect of the issue on the field of
estate planning. Part VI briefly outlines the relevant portions of the proposed
regulations addressing the issue. Part VII examines some interesting issues raised
in the opinion. Finally, Part VIII concludes, arguing that the Court's interpretation
was the only reasonable resolution.
I1. THE STATUTORY SCHEME

The first step in calculating "taxable income" is to determine "gross income,"
which is broadly defined as "all income from whatever source derived." 9 Certain
"above-the-line deductions" are taken from gross income in arriving at "adjusted
gross income."'" From adjusted gross income, the taxpayer may take "below-theline deductions," termed "itemized deductions," which are those deductions
authorized by the Code but not listed in § 62(a) as above-the-line deductions."
Section 67 of the Internal Revenue Code places a two-percent floor on what is
termed "miscellaneous itemized deductions."' 2 Miscellaneous itemized deductions
include all itemized deductions other than those items specifically listed in
§ 67(b)-such as interest expenses, casualty or theft losses, charitable contributions
and gifts, and medical expenses. 3 Under this section, deductions for these items are
"allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds [two]
percent of adjusted gross income."' 4

9. Id.§ 61(a).
10. Id. § 62(a).
11. Id. § 63(d) ("For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'itemized deductions' means the
deductions allowable under this chapter other than-(1) the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted
gross income, and (2) the deduction for personal exemptions provided by [§] 151.").
12. See id. § 67. Section 67 provides,
(a) General rule
In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions for any
taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such
deductions exceeds [two] percent of adjusted gross income.
(e) Determination of adjusted gross income in case of estates and trusts
For purposes of this section, the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust
shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual, except
that
(1) the deductions for costs which are paid or incurred in connection with the
administration of the estate or trust and which would not have been incurred if the
property were not held in such trust or estate ... shall be treated as allowable in
arriving at adjusted gross income.
Id.§ 67(a), (e).
13. Id. § 67(b).
14. Id. § 67(a).
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An even larger obstacle to taking a miscellaneous itemized deduction than the
two-percent floor is the alternative minimum tax (AMT). 5 The AMT disallows
miscellaneous itemized deductions listed in § 67(b) in their entirety. 6 Therefore,
taxpayers whose tax liability is calculated under the AMT will not be able to deduct
any investment advisory fees, regardless of whether they exceed two percent of
adjusted gross income.
In computing an individual's adjusted gross income, expenses incurred for
investment advisory fees are deductible under § 212.17 Because these fees are
miscellaneous itemized deductions, they are subject to the two-percent floor. These
fees are also completely disallowed for AMT purposes. Section 67(e), in general,
requires that income of a trust or estate be taxed in the same manner as an
individual. Therefore, it follows naturally that all expenses related to the estate that
fall outside of the list in § 67(b), including investment advisory fees, are limited by
the two-percent floor and are disallowed under the AMT. However, § 67(e)(1)
provides an exception for trusts and estates: The two-percent floor does not apply
to expenses "incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or trust
and which would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust
or estate."' 8 The interpretation of the second prong of this exception-what
constitutes expenses "which would not have been incurred if the property were not
held in such trust or estate"' 9 has been the subject of substantial debate. The
Court's decision addressed this issue in the context of investment advisory fees.2"
II.

BACKGROUND OF

A.

§ 67(e)

Purpose of the Two-PercentFloor

Although legislative history indicates Congress's objectives in imposing the
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, there is ultimately no justifiable
purpose apart from raising revenue. Congress imposed the two-percent floor on
itemized deductions for the purpose of limiting personal deductions. 2' Congress

15. A trust must calculate its tax liability under the regular tax and the alternative minimum tax
(AMT) and pay whichever tax is higher. The AMT imposes a flat twenty-six percent tax rate on a trust's
income between $22,500 and $175,000, and imposes a twenty-eight percent tax rate on the taxable
excess that exceeds $175,000. See id. § 55(d)( 1)(C) (providing a $22,500 exemption amount for trusts);
id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing the tax brackets under the AMT).
16. Id. § 56(b)(1)(A)(l) (disallowing any miscellaneous itemized deductions, as defined under
§ 67(b), for purposes of computing tax liability under the AMT).
17. See id. § 212. Section 212 provides a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
"(1) for the production or collection of income; [and] (2) for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income." Id.
18. Id. § 67(e)(1).
19. Id.
20. See Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2008).
21. See S. REP. No. 99-313, at 78 79 (1986), reprintedin 1986-3 C.B. 3 ("[S]ome miscellaneous
expenses allowable under present law are sufficiently personal in nature that they would have been
incurred apart from any business or investment activities of the taxpayer.").
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observed that individuals erroneously deducted more than was allowed for these
itemized deductions."z For example,
[c]ommon taxpayer errors have included disregarding the
restrictions on home office deductions, and on the types of
education expenses that are deductible; claiming a deduction for
safe deposit expenses even if used only to store personal
belongings; and deducting the cost of subscriptions to widely read
publications outlining business information without a sufficient
business or investment purpose.23
Furthermore, allowing the itemized deductions imposed extensive recordkeeping
duties.24 The report noted, "Since many taxpayers incur some expenses that are
allowable as miscellaneous itemized deductions, but these expenses commonly are
small in amount, the Congress concluded that the complexity created by prior law
was undesirable., 25 However, § 67 does not further this purpose. In order to reduce
the record-keeping burden on taxpayers, Congress simply capped that deduction.
This is no benefit to taxpayers who still have to keep records of deductible
transactions in order to determine whether they exceed two percent of adjusted
gross income and, if so, by how much. The only solution to eliminating the recordkeeping burden is to eliminate the deduction.
The original House and Senate versions of the bill did not include the second
prong in § 67(e)(1), so the original version only limited deductions of costs which
were not "paid or incurred in connection with administration of the estate or
trust., 26 The language in the second prong was not added until later in the
legislative process.2 During oral argument in Knight, Justice Ginsburg asked Mr.
Miller, counsel for the government, whether it is appropriate to limit the effect of
the second prong so as to allow more taxpayers to fall within the exception, because
it was added at the very last minute.28 Mr. Miller responded by stating that the
clause must be given full effect regardless of the timing.2 9 In the Knight opinion,

22. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986,
at 78 (1987) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE]. This problem is particularly characteristic of problems
arising with individual income tax deductions rather than deductions for costs incurred by a fiduciary
of an estate or trust. See id. For example, a person may deduct the expense of business journals and
newspapers as an investment management expense when, in actuality, this literature was purchased for
the individual's personal enjoyment. This is unlikely to occur in the context of trusts or estates.
23. Id. at 78 n.52.
24. Id. at 78.
25. Id. The Supreme Court in Knight glossed over the legislative history of § 67, but it did
mention the recordkeeping work and the administrative difficulty imposed by the prior tax system. See
Knight, 128 S. CE at 785 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 109 (1985)).
26. See Brief for Petitioner at 32, Knight, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008) (No. 06-1286), 2007 WL
2428375.
27. See id.
28. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Knight, 128 S. C. 782 (2008) (No. 06-1286), available
at http://wwv.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/06-1286.pdf.
29. Id.
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however, the Supreme Court did not discuss any effect of the timing of the second
clause in its interpretation.
B. General Goals of Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1986
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States,3" the Federal Circuit noted two of
Congress's goals in the Tax Reform Act of 1986."' First, Congress wanted "to
32
increase fairness, economic efficiency, and simplification of the tax system.'
Congress was concerned that some taxpayers were able to manipulate the tax code
to exclude or deduct items that differed only slightly from what other taxpayers
treated as taxable.33 Although Congress wanted the tax code to be simple, it
observed that complexity may be necessary with regard to those taxpayers who take
advantage of certain tax preferences so the government can accurately determine
their income and tax them at the appropriate rate.34
Second, Congress intended "to eliminate or reduce the tax benefit of placing
assets in a trust."3 In its brief in Knight,the government argues that by enacting the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress moved toward its articulated goals "largely by
closing loopholes and reducing marginal rates in order to make economically
inefficient tax-avoidance schemes less attractive."36 The government also contended
in its brief that preventing trusts from fully deducting advisory fees furthers
Congress's goal of reducing the tax benefit of placing assets in trust and sheltering
income at lower tax rates.3
C. Fairnessin Comparisonto Individuals
Arguably, an inconsistency exists in striving for the goal of a fair tax system
while also limiting the deduction of an individual for certain expenses, but not
doing the same for a trust or estate. Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986
in order to address concerns that the prior tax system was fundamentally unfair. 8
One of the general goals of the legislation was to assure a fairer, more efficient, and

30. 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
31. See id.at1281.
32. Id.(citing S. REP. No. 99-313, at3 (1986), reprintedin 1986-3 C.B. 3).
33. Id.(citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at57 (1985), reprintedin 1986-3 C.B. 2).
34. Id.(citing S. REP. No. 99-313, at 4 (1986), reprintedin 1986-3 C.B. 3).
35. Id.("[T]he tax benefits which result from the ability to split income between a trust or estate
and its
beneficiaries should be eliminated or significantly reduced." (quoting S. REP. No. 99-313, at 868
(1986), reprintedin 1986-3 C.B. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Brief for Respondent at 11, Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008) (No. 06-1286),
2007 WL 1520971 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 54-61 (1985), reprintedin 1986-3 C.B. 2).
37. Id.at 12. Legislative history indicates that Congress addressed its goal of fairness and
reducing the tax benefits of placing assets in trusts by revising the tax brackets for trusts. See S. REP.
No. 99-313, at 868 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 3 ("[T]he bill attempts to reduce the benefits
arising from the use of trusts and estates by revising the rate schedule applicable to trusts and
estates ....
").However, this is not the only way for Congress to address these legitimate goals.
38. See discussion supra Part IIB.
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simpler tax system. 9 In Mellon Bank, the Federal Circuit mentioned that another
goal-related to this general goal of fairness-was to "equate the taxation of trusts
with the taxation of individuals."4 The express goal of equating taxation of trusts
and individuals favors the government's interpretation of the statute. 4 Individuals
may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses incurred "for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income."42
Although these are two very different entities-particularly with regard to a
trustee's fiduciary duty allowing the same deductions for both a trust and an
individual only seems fair.
D. Limiting Deductions Through Pass-ThroughEntities
In Knight, the trustee argued that Congress added the second prong to § 67(e)
in order to parallel the restriction on the indirect deduction of expenses of passthrough entities included in § 67(c).43 Section 67(c)(1) directs that regulations be
issued "which prohibit the indirect deduction through pass-thru entities of amounts
which are not allowable as a deduction if paid or incurred directly by an
individual." 44 Section 67(c)(3)(B) explains that this disallowance is not applicable
to trusts and estates except as provided in the regulations.45 Arguably, the second
prong of § 67(e)(1) was added with the narrow purpose of subjecting trusts to the
same restraint on deduction through pass-through entities as that applied to
individuals in § 67(c)(1).
Turning to the Conference Report, Congress appears to have added the second
prong with administration expenses of pass-through entities in mind:
[T]he floor is to apply with respect to indirect deductions through
pass-through entities (including mutual funds) other than estates,
nongrantor trusts, cooperatives, and REITs. The floor also applies
with respect to indirect deductions through grantor trusts,
partnerships, and S corporations by virtue of present-law grantor
trust and pass-through rules. In the case of an estate or trust, the
conference agreement provides that the adjusted gross income is
to be computed in the same manner as in the case of an
individual, except that the deductions for costs that are paid or
incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or

39. See supratext accompanying note 32.
40. Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1281. But see John M. Janiga & Louis S. Harrison, DeductingFees
for Investment Advice, TR. & EST., Apr. 2007, at 42, 47 ("[T]here is nothing in the legislative history
to the TRA '86 that supports [the Mellon Bank statement regarding individual and trust equality].").
41. See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
42. I.R.C. § 212(2) (2000).
43. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008) (No. 061286), 2007 WL 906695.
44. 1.R.C. § 67(c)(1).
45. Id. § 67(c)(3)(B).
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trust and that would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust or estate are treated as allowable in arriving
at adjusted gross income and hence are not subject to the floor.
The regulations to be prescribed by the Treasury relating to
application ofthe floor with respect to indirect deductions through
certain pass-through entities are to include such reporting
requirements as may be necessary to effectuate this provision. 46
Possibly, Congress intended to allow trusts to continue fully deducting all
administrative costs that were traditionally deducted and incurred in connection
with a trust or estate, excepting those costs incurred through pass-through entities
and other similar unforeseen costs.47 As the Second Circuit pointed out in Knight,
the available legislative history does not provide clear insight into congressional
intent, and the statutory language does not articulate this proposed narrow purpose
of the second prong.48 Rather, the court found that the broad language of the statute
indicates that Congress intended the two-percent floor to apply to administrative
costs incurred by individuals and trusts alike.49 The Supreme Court did not address
this issue in Knight.
E. Reference Point
One point of disagreement over the interpretation of § 67(e) has been whether
the point of reference is a general trust or the specific trust at issue. The statute
allows a deduction for costs related to "the administration of the estate or trust and
which would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust or
estate."' In Knight, the trustee contended that the words "such trust" in § 67(e)(1)
referred to the particular trust seeking the deduction as opposed to a generic trust,
as indicated in the introductory language of § 67(e).5 The trustee read the statute
as requiring a court to consider whether a particular cost would have been incurred
had that particular trust property never been placed into a trust.5 2 Such a reading of
the statute would require the IRS to make an individualized determination of
whether the hypothetical owner of that property would have incurred an investment

46. H.R. REP. No.99-841, pt. 2, at 34 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075,
4122.
47. One commentator opined that § 67(e)(1) "seems to be concerned more with the origin of
certain costs (i.e., that indirect expenses coming to the trust
or estate from other pass-through entities
would remain subject to the 2% limitation) rather than a wholesale abandonment of prior statutory
practice." Craig Janes, FiduciaryAdministrativeExpenses:How Much is Deductible?,EST.PLAN.,Nov.
2005, at 21, 25.
48. See William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm'r, 467 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)
("Nothing in the legislative history suggests a clearly expressed congressional intent contrary to the
plain meaning of the statute itself").
49. Id. at 159 60.
50. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (emphasis added).
51. Rudkin, 467 F.3d at155.
52. Id.
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advisory fee had the property not been in a trust. The government cannot effectively
administer the tax law using this case-by-case determination: the point of reference
should be whether investors would generally incur investment advisory fees.
The Second Circuit rejected the trustee's interpretation as unreasonable, finding
the correct point of reference to be a generic trust. 53 Rather than adopting a
subjective inquiry into whether the investment advisory fees would have been
incurred, the Second Circuit read the statute to demand an objective inquiry as to
whether the cost "is one that is peculiar to trusts [in general] and one that
individuals are incapable of incurring., 54 Basically, the court adopted the
government's interpretation that the expense is deductible only if it is one that
could not possibly have been incurred by an individual.55 The court determined that
the reference point of § 67(e)(1) is the individual and that the rules that apply to
individual taxpayers also apply to trusts and estates.56 This conclusion was based
on the broad and inclusive introduction of§ 67(e): "For purposes of this section, the
adjusted gross income of an estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner
as in the case of an individual .... ,, The court relied on this general introductory
language and concluded that "nothing in the statute indicates that Congress
intended to make applicability of the deduction dependent on what costs are
peculiarly incurred by a specific trust. 58
IV. THE INTERPRETIVE DILEMMA

The decision in Knight v. Commissioner resolved a pronounced circuit split
regarding the interpretation of the second prong of § 67(e)(1) and its application to
investment advisory fees. Examination of the interpretations by the different
circuits sheds light on the Court's resolution of the issue. Although some circuits
found the statutory language to be clear and unambiguous, courts still produced
three different interpretations of the statute.
The first circuit to decide the issue was the Sixth Circuit, which held that
investment advisory fees are fully deductible because they are necessary to satisfy
the trustee's fiduciary duties. 5 9 The Fourth and Federal Circuits, on the other hand,
found investment advisory fees to be subject to the two-percent floor because they
are not unique to trusts and estates; such fees are commonly incurred by
individuals. 6' The final circuit to address the issue was the Second Circuit, which

53. See id. at 157 (".'[S]uch trust' is best understood as referring to the generic trust of § 67(e)'s
introductory language .. ").
54. Id. at 156.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. I.R.C. § 67(e) (2000).
58. Rudkin, 467 F.3d at 157.
59. See O'Neill v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993).
60. See Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 140 (4th Cir. 2003); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1281 82 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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adopted the narrowest interpretation of the statute. 6 ' The Second Circuit held that
investment advisory fees are subject to the two-percent floor because an individual
holding the property could incur such costs.62 Noting this stark split in the circuits,
63
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Knight v. Commissioner,
and then adopted an interpretation similar to that of the Fourth and Federal
Circuits.64
A.

The Taxpayer's Argument

In Knight v. Commisioner, the trust's argument was based on the fact that a
trustee's fiduciary duty is distinctive and requires balancing of the needs of current
and future beneficiaries, according to the terms of the trust.6 5 In the lower court, the
trust argued that the second prong of § 67(e) "sets forth a 'but for' causal test: if the
cost would not have been incurred without the trustee, then it is attributable to the
trustee's performance of its fiduciary duty and is thus fully deductible under
§ 67(e)(1)." 66 To the Supreme Court, the trust argued that payments to a third party
for performance of fiduciary services done on behalf of the trustee constitute trustee
fees, and that investment advisory fees are simply the trustee's fees for services
delegated to professionals. 6 7 The trust contended that a trustee without expertise
must seek investment advice in order to comply with fiduciary obligations. 68 The
trust drew particular attention to the fact that the trustee faces liability to the
beneficiaries if these demanding requirements are not met. 69 At oral argument, it

61. See Rudkin, 467 F.3d 149.
62. See id.at 155 56.
63. Knight v. Comm'r, 127 S. Ct. 3005 (2007) (mem.). Taxpayers in other circuits did not have
a clear rule and thus were at risk of incurring penalties, deficiencies, and interest if they chose to deduct
these fees. See Janes, supra note 47, at 27. Janes notes that taxpayers may be assessed with an
"accuracy-related penalty" for the understatement of their tax burden; however, as a defense, taxpayers
may point to the "substantial authority standard." Id.; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(a) (d) (2007)
(setting forth the substantial authority standard). This prior circuit split also created unequal taxation
across the circuits, creating an incentive for trusts to migrate or change their situs to the Sixth Circuit.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 43, at 5. Congress has not given sufficient attention to this
issue since it was first raised in 1982, and Congress has made no attempt to clarify the statute's
meaning. See Janiga & Harrison, supranote 40, at 48.
64. See Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 789-90 (2008) (noting that a court's focus in
determining if § 67(e)(1) excepts a certain cost is whether "it
would be [an] uncommon (or unusual, or
unlikely) [cost] for such a hypothetical individual to incur"); supra text accompanying note 60.
65. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 7.
66. See William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm'r, 467 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
67. See Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 786; Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1279 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("It is undisputed that trustee fees are fully deductible.").
68. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 786.
69. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 28, at 51-52 ("Trust investment advice is always
distinct from the investment advice that's given to individuals, both because of the demanding legal
obligations specifying certain factors that have to be taken into account by the trustee in investing and
because of the risk of personal liability."). Counsel for the trust supported this argument by referring
to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which does not permit safe, conservative investments that many
individuals choose to make. See id. at 52; infra notes 78 80 and accompanying text (discussing the
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appeared that the Justices were sympathetic to the trust's case. Justice Souter
commented that an investment advisor provides advice that may absolve the trustee
from liability, "something that the individual investor does not provide for or need
to provide for."7 ° Justice Scalia explained that although the advice given to a trustee
and to an individual may be the same "in substance," advice given to a trustee on
how to fulfill his responsibilities under the trust is unique, looking to the objectives
of the trust instrument.7'
The trust urged the Court to adopt the interpretation of the Sixth Circuit the
only circuit court that found in favor of the taxpayer on the issue at hand.72 In
O'Neill v. Commissioner,the Sixth Circuit held that investment advisory fees paid
by a trust are eligible for full deduction under the second prong of § 67(e). 73 The
court emphasized the duty of a trustee "to invest and manage trust assets as a
'prudent investor' would manage his own assets. ' 74 The trustee's responsibility
includes the duty to diversify investments in order to distribute risk. 75 The court
distinguished individual investors from fiduciaries-fiduciaries have an obligation
to the trust beneficiaries to invest prudently and skillfully, whereas individuals have
no such obligations with regard to their own investments.76 The court focused on
the trustee's qualifications and experience-it recognized the necessity of
professional advice for an inexperienced trustee in order to comply with fiduciary
obligations.7 7 Thus, the court seems to have interpreted § 67(e)(1) to mean that the
costs would not have been incurred if the property had not been held in such trust,
in the context of the particular trust at issue.
The adoption of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act in most states makes the
argument based on fiduciary obligations especially relevant. 78 The Act requires
prudent care in managing trust assets as well as consideration of factors such as
inflation, tax consequences, expected return, and liquidity. 7 A common individual
trustee likely will not have the expertise to invest trust funds in accordance with the
prudent investor act of the state in which the trust is located, will need to consult

Uniform Prudent Investor Act).
70. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 34.
71. See id. at 35. Justice Scalia reasoned, "[O]nly a trustee seeks advice as to how he can fulfill
his responsibilities under the trust." Id.
72. See O'Neill v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993).
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Forty-four states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted different
versions ofthe Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See UNIF. LAW COMM'RS,A FEW FACTS ABOUTTHE... :
UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fsupria.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2008) (listing states that adopted the Act).
79. UNIT. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1995) ("A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets
as a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill,
and caution.").
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investment advisors, and will incur fees for the advisor's services. 0 O'Neill
recognized a distinction between trusts-whose trustees are often requiredtoobtain
investment advice according to the trustee's fiduciary duty-and individuals-who
are free to do as they please." However, this distinction is somewhat tenuous.2
Simply because trustees incur the costs does not mean that individuals would not.1
In fact, like many trusts, the individual investor will balance the need for a current
return and the importance of future appreciation and saving for retirement or for
future generations.
B.

The Government's Argument

During oral argument in Knight,the government offered two interpretations of
§ 67(e)(1). The first interpretation was based on its most recent success in the
Second Circuit, which gave the most restrictive interpretation of the statute. 3 The
government's fallback argument was that the interpretation given by the Fourth and
Federal Circuits was the proper interpretation of the statute. 4 In the lower court's
decision, the Second Circuit held that investment advisory fees incurred by a trust
never satisfy the second prong of § 67(e)(1) and are not fully deductible."5 The
Second Circuit proffered the following construction:
[T]he plain meaning of § 67(e)(1)'s second clause excludes from
full deduction those costs of a type that could be incurred if the
property were held individually rather than in trust. In other
words, for the trust to avoid the two-percent floor and have
advantage of the full deduction, the plain language of the statute
requires certainty that a particular cost 'would not have been
incurred' if the property were not held in trust.86
This restrictive interpretation departs from the plain language of the statute by
substituting the words couldnot for wouldnot and ignoring the use8 of
the terms the
7
trust and such trust that seem to refer to the specific trust at issue.

80. See id. § 9 (authorizing trustees to delegate investment and management functions).
81. See O'Neill v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993); supra text accompanying notes
70 71 (noting the Court's discussion of the same distinction during oral argument in Knight).
82. During oral argument in Knight, Chief Justice Roberts commented that investment advisory
fees are not unique to trusts because an individual "may have exactly the same objectives as a trustee."
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 13.
83. See id. at 26 29.
84. See id. at 29 30.
85. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm'r, 467 F.3d 149, 159-60 (6th Cir. 2006).
86. Id. at 155-56.
87. The Rudkin courtjustified this construction by stating that where a statute is ambiguous, courts
should resolve controversies regarding deductions in favor of the government. Id. at 157. The Second
Circuit derived this principle from the following language in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering:
"Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as
there is clear provision therefore can any particular deduction be allowed." 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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The government's fallback argument in Knight proffered the interpretation of
the Federal and Fourth Circuits-that an expense fulfills the second prong of
§ 67(e)(1) if it is not commonly or customarily incurred by individuals.88 The
Federal Circuit in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States89 and the Fourth Circuit in
Scott v. UnitedStates90 determined that fees for investment management and advice
did not fall into the exception created by § 67(e)( 1).9' The Federal Circuit explained
that, in order to meet the second prong of § 67(e)(1), a trust's expense must be
"unique to the administration of a trust and not customarily incurred outside of
trusts." 92 Because an individual taxpayer is likely to incur investment advisory fees
when investing large sums of money, the Fourth and Federal Circuits ruled that
these fees do not meet the second prong and are not fully deductible. 93
In response to the trust's argument that payments to a third party for
performance of fiduciary services constitute "trust fees" and meet the second prong
of § 67(e)(I )," the Federal Circuit noted that if a trustee chooses to hire outside
consultants to satisfy the trustee's fiduciary duties, rather than investing without
professional advice, the trustee "must accept the tax consequences of his
choice." 95Although the fiduciary obligations of trustees play a large role in the fees
incurred by the trust for administration expenses, 96 the court in Mellon Bank
determined that it was "not bound by the fiduciary standards established by state
law" and the only binding authority was the intent of Congress and the statute's

The policy underlying the Court's ruling in New ColonialIce was that Congress is given broad power
to tax income and a taxpayer must point to a specific, applicable statutory provision in order to claim
a deduction. See id. Here, however, there is a specific statutory provision authorizing the
deduction-§ 212 provides a deduction for investment advisory fees. I.R.C. § 212 (2000). Although
§ 67(a) limits that deduction, § 67(e) provides an exception for administrative expenses that specifically
applies to trusts and estates, which have historically deducted administrative expenses such as
investment advisory fees. See id. § 67(a), (e); Janes, supra note 47, at 23 24. Therefore, because there
is a specific provision for a deduction, the Rudkin court was free to resolve ambiguity to effect
congressional intent, without a preference for the government.
88. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 29 30.
89. 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
90. 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003).
91. See id. at 140; Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1281.
92. Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1281. The Court construed the second prong of § 67(e)(1) as
focusing "not on the relationshipbetween the trust and costs, but the type of costs, and whether those
costs would have been incurred even if the assets were not held in a trust." Id. at 1280-81 (emphasis
added).
93. See Scott, 328 F.3d at 140 ("Investment-advice fees ... are often incurred by individual
taxpayers in the management of income-producing property not held in trust."); Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d
at 1280-81.
94. See Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1279.
95. Id. at 1281.
96. See O'Neill v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993). O'Neill recognized that trustees
with no investment experience likely must seek investment advice in order to comply with the fiduciary
duty of a prudent investor. Id.; see also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
prudent investor standard for trustees).
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plain meaning.97 Therefore, the Fourth and Federal Circuits rejected the argument
that all expenses resulting from the fiduciary obligations are fully deductible,
explaining that this construction would render the second prong superfluous.98 The
Fourth Circuit explained,
All trust-related administrative expenses could be attributed to a
trustee's fiduciary duties, and the broad reading of § 67(e)(1)
urged by the taxpayers would treat as fully deductible any costs
associated with a trust. But the second clause of § 67(e)(1)
specifically limits the applicability of § 67(e) to certain types of
trust-related administrative expenses. To give effect to this
limitation, we must hold that the investment-advice fees incurred
by the [t]rust do not qualify for the exception created by § 67(e).99
The trust in Knight criticized the analysis of the Fourth and Federal Circuits on
the ground that the second prong of § 67(e)(1) was enacted to prevent trusts from
deducting the administrative expenses of pass-through entities as trust
expenses-expenses that would have been incurred regardless of whether the
property was held by an individual or a trust.' Therefore, the trust contended, even
if the Court allowed a deduction for all fiduciary-related expenses, the second prong
would not be rendered superfluous because it would still prevent the trust from
deducting expenses incurred by a pass-through entity.
V.

PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS

In its petition for writ of certiorari in Knight v. Commissioner, the trust
articulated the far-reaching effects of § 67(e) and the difficulties caused by its
uncertain interpretation.' 0 ' According to one estimate, trusts and estates reported

97. Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1280 (citing Comm'r v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.,
417 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1974)). "The propriety of a deduction does not turn upon equitable
considerations .... Rather, it depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision
therefor can any particular deduction be allowed." Id. (quoting Nat'Alfalfa, 417 U.S. at 148 49)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Arguably, the court's refusal to consider fiduciary standards in
reliance on National Alfalfa is misplaced. In National Alfalfa, the taxpayer argued that a corporate
transaction was the practical equivalent of a debt discount under I.R.C. § 163(1), entitling it to a
deduction. See Nat 'lAlfalfa, 417 U.S. at 142. The Court refused to rely on equitable considerations in
determining whether a provision allowing a deduction applied. See id. at 148-49. In Mellon Bank, the
taxpayers were referring not to mere equitable considerations but to legal obligations required by law.
See Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1279 80. Congress must have been aware of the fiduciary obligations of
trustees when enacting the statute, and because these obligations have become more uniform and clearly
articulated, see supra note 78, they significantly impact the effect of § 67(e).
98. See Scott, 328 F.3d at 140; Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1280 (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523
U.S. 57, 62 (1998)).
99. Scott, 328 F.3d at 140.
100. See William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm'r, 467 F.3d 149, 157 & n.3 (6th Cir.
2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 43, at 24-25.
101. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 43, at 1 3.
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over $129 billion of gross income in 2006.102 As of 2005, more than $1 trillion in
assets were held in trusts and estates in the United States.'03 Trusts spend billions
of dollars on investment advisory fees annually. °4 Therefore, the tax treatment of
investment advisory fees is of paramount concern to both trust beneficiaries and the
financial services industry.
A.

Combined Fee-Resistance to Break Down "Trustee Fee"

Faced with the loss of these deductions, estate planners may form trusts naming
corporate trustees, such as banks and investment brokers, that can manage the
investments in-house and charge a single trustee fee.1 5 This plan relies on the
courts' indication that a trustee's fee is fully deductible.'0 6 However, not only is this
strategy unlikely to be acceptable to the IRS, °7 but it may also be an obstacle to a
corporate trustee's obligation to comply with fiduciary standards and avoid
conflicts of interest. Thus, the corporate trustee will likely charge a separate fee for
investment advice or stipulate in an agreement that the trustee fee includes fees for
investment advice by the trustee or its subsidiary; the agreement will also disclose
the breakdown of the trustee fee accordingly.'0 8
In its brief in opposition to the trustee's appeal from the Court of Federal
Claims in Knight, the government maintained that § 67(e) requires a trustee to
separate fiduciary advisory and management fees from other trustee fees. 9 In
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, the trustee responded to a similar argument by
contending that allocating previously unbundled trustee fees would be exceedingly

102. I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME TAX: STATS-INCOME FROM TRUSTS & ESTATES tbl. 1 (2006),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06fd01.xls.
103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 43, at1-3 (citing F.D.I.C., TRUST INST. INFO: 2005
FDIC TRUST REPORT, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/trust/report2005.html).
104. See I.R.S., supra note 102, at tbl. 1. For 2006, nearly $5.7 billion was deducted on fiduciary
income tax returns as "other deductions" not subject to the two-percent floor more than $1.6 billion was
deducted for "allowable miscellaneous deductions"; and over $4.2 billion was deducted for "fiduciary
fees." Id. These categories most likely comprise investment advisory and management fees.
105. See Janiga & Harrison, supra note 40, at 48.
106. See id.
("Given that the Federal Circuit, Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit have all indicated
that trustee's fees are fully deductible, such an approach might be viable.").
107. See Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,243, 41,245 (July 27, 2007)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.67-4) (requiring trustees to unbundle fees).
108. For example, the South Carolina Code imposes a duty of loyalty on a trustee and provides
that a conflict-of-interest transaction is voidable absent certain circumstances. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-802(a) (b) (1987). The statute further provides, "An investment by a trustee in securities of an
investment company .. .to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides [investment advice] is not
presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if the investment
otherwise complies with the [Prudent Investor Act]." Id. § 62-7-802(F). However, the trustee may be
compensated by the trust for its investment advisory services "ifthe trustee at least annually notifies
the [trust beneficiaries] of the rate and method by which the compensation was determined." Id.
109. Brief for the Appellee at50 n. 14, William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v.Comm'r, 467
F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-5151), 2006 WL 4706659; see also Section 67 Limitations on Estates
or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. at 41,245 (requiring trustees to unbundle fees).
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costly." 0 The court in Mellon Bank acknowledged that unbundling fees may be
expensive but noted that Congress has authority to establish tax policy."' The court
explained, "The IRS has considerable leeway in adopting procedures and
regulations for enforcement of 1.R.C.
§ 67(e)(1) so as to keep the cost of
' 12
compliance reasonably contained." "
Because the Supreme Court in Knight decided that investment advisory fees are
not exempt from the two-percent floor," 3 a trustee will need to separate fully
deductible costs from investment advisory fees and other fees that are subject to the
two-percent floor.'
The government will apply the "substance-over-form"
doctrine, which for tax purposes makes the actual substance of the cost the deciding
factor rather than how the trust labels the particular cost."' If the substance of the
trust fee is costs incurred for investment management and advice, corporate trustees
will be required to break down that fee to show investment advisory fees as separate
from the trustee's fee.
B. Nature of the Trust
The impact of the deductibility of investment advisory fees on a particular trust
arguably depends on the way the trust is structured-specifically, the amount of
income that the trust is required to distribute. A trust may deduct all of the income
that it distributes as required by the trust agreement." 6 Therefore, a trust that
distributes most of its income will have a lower adjusted gross income and therefore
a lower two-percent floor. 1 7 As a result, such a trust will be able to deduct much
of its investment advisory fees." 8 In contrast, a trust that does not distribute much
of its income will have a higher adjusted gross income and, consequently, a higher
two-percent floor." 9 For this type of trust, the loss of the deduction of investment

110. See 47 Fed. Cl. 186, 194-95 (2000).
111. See id. ("[W]ith respect to complaints about potential costs that would result from legislation,
it is the responsibility of Congress, and not the courts, to establish tax policy.").
112. Id. at 195.
113. See Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 791 (2008).
114. Faced with the possibility that some investment advisory fees may be deductible and other
trust-specific advisory fees may not, Justice Scalia noted in oral argument in Knight that courts should
not be involved in deciding what portion of the fee should be allocated to maximizing total
return and
what should be allocated to other services unique to trusts. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote
28, at 37. Justice Scalia opined, "That's just a crazy way to run a tax system, it seems to me." Id.
115. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 281 F.3d 1108, 1116 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Under the
substance-over-form doctrine, the IRS and the courts may recharacterize a transaction in accordance
with its substance, if the substance of the transaction is demonstrably contrary to the form." (quoting
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND

46-47 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See 1.R.C. § 651(a) (2000) (allowing a deduction for income "required to be distributed
currently"); id.§ 661(a) (same).
117. For a brief discussion regarding the calculation of adjusted gross income see supra text
accompanying notes 9-14.
118. See Janes, supra note 47, at 21.
119. Id.at21 22.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
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advisory fees has a significant impact on the trust's tax liability. 2 ' Furthermore,
large trusts that accumulate income rather than distribute it will likely be subject to
the AMT. 2 ' For those trusts whose tax liability is calculated under the AMT, all
investment advisory fees will be disallowed. Thus, the statute apparently
encourages a trust arrangement where income is distributed rather than invested.'22
C. ProposedRegulation
The IRS issued new proposed regulations on July 27, 2007, to address the
applicability of the two-percent floor to certain costs incurred by an estate or
trust. 123 These regulations were irrelevant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Knight,
but if adopted, they will apply to future trusts and estates. 124 The proposed
regulations generally follow the Second Circuit's restrictive interpretation of
§ 67(e) in Rudkin. 12 They provide that a cost is "unique" to an estate or trust, and
therefore not subject to the two-percent floor, "if an individual could not have
incurred that cost in connection with property not held in an estate or trust.' 26 The
regulations apply the substance-over-form doctrine and explain that in order to
determine if an expense qualifies, the taxpayer should look to the type of product
or service rendered rather than to the manner in which such cost is labeled or
characterized. 127 The regulation proceeds to enumerate a non-exclusive list of
expenses that the IRS classifies as unique:
Fiduciary accountings; judicial or quasi-judicial filings required
as part of the administration of the estate or trust; fiduciary
income tax and estate tax returns; the division or distribution of
income or corpus to or among beneficiaries; trust or will contest

120. See Janiga & Harrison, supra note 40, at 43 ("If the trust has a large amount of [investment
advisory fees], the loss of deduction for regular tax purposes can be substantial.").
121. See supra notes 15 16 and accompanying text.
122. However, in reality the statute may not encourage distribution of trust income because the
beneficiary of a trust that distributes most of its income will still have to pay income tax on that
distribution. See 1.R.C. § 61(a)(15).
123. See Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,243 (July 27, 2007) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.67-4).
124. At oral argument in Knight, Mr. Miller, arguing on behalf of the government, conceded that
the I RS was not entitled to Chevron deference-because the IRS had not yet issued a regulation-but
he sought deference to what he described as "the consistent position of the Service since the statute was
enacted that the investment advice be subject to the 2 percent floor." Transcript of Oral Argument,
supranote 28, at 47.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
126. Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. at 41,245 (emphasis added). Now
that the Supreme Court has rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation, the IRS may change this
regulation to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation and to avoid being challenged as an invalid
interpretation of the statute. See Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 787-88 (2008).
127. See Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. at 41,245.
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or construction; fiduciary bond premiums; and communications
with beneficiaries regarding estate or trust matters. 128
Noticeably absent from this list are legal fees, which have customarily been
deductible for trusts and estates. 1 29 Under the proposed regulations, legal fees will
now be subject to the two-percent floor because individuals can, and frequently do,
incur them. 3 ' Most likely, the portion of legal fees considered fully deductible will
be those fees charged for services listed in the proposed regulation drafting and
filing fiduciary accountings; judicial filings; fiduciary income tax returns;
performing services related to a will contest; and meeting with beneficiaries. 3 '
Furthermore, individuals incur costs related to accountings, income tax preparation,
and bond premiums, but these expenses are characterized as "fiduciary" under the
proposed regulations and therefore considered "unique."' 3 2 Investment advisory
fees are usually incurred in order to comply with the fiduciary obligations of the
trustee.' Thus, it seems inconsistent that these expenses are not also characterized
as "fiduciary" expenses, and therefore "unique."' 34 The regulations then list
examples of expenses the government does not consider unique, which includes
products or services rendered in connection with "[c]ustody or management of
property; advice on investing for total return."' 35 Essentially, the line drawn by the
proposed regulations between unique and nonunique costs is vague, but it is
nonetheless an attempt at providing certainty to the taxpayer.
The proposed regulations also require fiduciaries to unbundle their fees for
management of a trust or estate.' 36 This requirement will have a significant impact

128. Id.
129. Carol Cantrell's Take on ProposedRegs A Cleaner Version, STEVE LEIMBERG'S EST.
PLAN. NEWSL. Archive Message #1155 (Leimberg Info. Servs., Inc.), July 30, 2007, at 6,
http://leimbergservices.com [hereinafter Carol Cantrell's Take].
130. Id.
131. See supra text accompanying note 128.
132. Carol Cantrell's Take, supra note 129, at 7.
133. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Prudent Investor standards).
134. However, the investment advisor would charge the same fee for the same advice, regardless
of the reason for seeking that advice.
135. Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,243, 41,245 (July 27, 2007) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.67-4). The regulations also subject to the two-percent floor costs incurred
for "the defense of claims by creditors ofthe decedent or grantor." Id. However, the IRS has recognized
that these costs, particularly those incurred in connection with a bankruptcy estate, are fully deductible
under § 67(e). See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200630016 (June 30, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0630016.pdf("[D]eductions for expenses paid or incurred in connection
with the administration of an individual's estate in bankruptcy that would have not been incurred if the
property were not held by the bankrupt estate is treated as allowable in arriving at adjusted gross
income.").
136. Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. at 41,245. Specifically, the
proposal provides the following regarding bundled fees:
If an estate or a non-grantor trust pays a single fee, commission or other expense
for both costs that are unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not, then the
estate or non-grantor trust must identify the portion (if any) of the legal,
accounting, investment advisory, appraisal or other fee, commission or expense
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on lawyers, accountants, and corporate trustees who manage trust assets. Carol
Cantrell, co-counsel for the Rudkin Trust, recently lamented, "The once sacrosanct
'trustee fee' that four U.S. appellate courts unanimously agree is fully deductible
in all cases is now largely subject to the 2-percent floor just like all the rest of the
trustee's administrative expenses.'' 3 7 Under the proposed regulations, corporate
trustees will no longer be able to easily charge a "trustee fee" for their services but
will be required to segregate these costs into at least two separate fees.

VII. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court began its analysis by rejecting the proposed interpretations
of both parties. It vigorously criticized the Second Circuit's interpretation, which
was espoused by the government: "This approach flies in the face of the statutory
language.' 3 8 The Court explained that if Congress intended the statute to mean
costs that "could not have been incurred" by an individual, it presumably would
have written just that, because "could" and "would" have different meanings. 13 9
Furthermore, because costs that could not be incurred by an individual would only
be incurred in the administration of a trust or estate, the Second Circuit's
interpretation renders the first prong of § 67(e) meaningless. 40
After dispensing with the trust's proposed interpretation, the Court identified
two procedural obstacles to the trustee: (1) the taxpayer had the burden of proving
its claim of a deduction. 4 and (2) the Court will narrowly construe an exception to
a "general statement of policy" so as to preserve the legislature's overall

that is unique to estates and trusts and is thus not subject to the 2-percent floor.
The taxpayer must use any reasonable method to allocate the single fee,
commission or expense between the costs unique to estates and trusts and other
costs.
Id.
137. Carol Cantrell's Take, supra note 129, at 5.
138. Knight v. Comm'r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 787 (2008). During oral argument, after debating with
Justice Scalia regarding the Second Circuit's interpretation and the difference between the words
"would" and "could," the following discussion ensued between Mr. Miller, arguing on behalf of the
government, and the Chief Justice:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You didn't think much of this argument before the
Second Circuit adopted it, did you? You didn't argue this before the Court of
Appeals?
(Laughter.)
MR. MILLER: We did not argue it beforeCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you have a fallback argument.
MR. MILLER: Well, that that's right.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, now might be a good time to fall back.
(Laughter.)
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 29.
139. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787 ("The fact that an individual could not do something is one reason
he would not, but not the only possible reason.").
140. Id. at 788-89.
141. See id. at 790.
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objective. 4 2 The Court described the trustee's proposed causation test as circular:
The statute exempts from the two-percent floor costs caused by the trustee's
fiduciary duties, but the only costs a trustee may incur are those that the trustee has
a fiduciary duty to incur."' Therefore, under the trust's interpretation, almost all of
a trust's administrative costs would be fully deductible because they would be
caused by the trustee's fiduciary duty. With this meaning, "§ 67(e)(1)'s exception
would swallow the general rule."' 44 Although the Court took note of the trust's
argument pertaining to the state's prudent investor act, it did not discuss how the
prudent investor standard distinguishes trustees from individuals.'45 Instead, the
Court twisted the trust's argument against it, noting that the standard was based on
what a prudent individual investor would do having the same investment
objectives.' 4 6 Then, the Court found the inquiry to be whether a hypothetical
individual investor, having the same investment objectives as the trust, would not
commonly or customarily incur these fees."' The Court, like the Federal and Fourth
Circuits, found that the trustee's interpretation would render the second prong
superfluous because it would in effect be the same inquiry as the first prong.'48
Accordingly, the Court found the trustee's proposed interpretation invalid.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, adopted an interpretation similar
to that of the Fourth and Federal Circuits, explaining,
The text requires determining what would happen if a fact were
changed; such an exercise necessarily entails a prediction; and
predictions are based on what would customarily or commonly
occur. Thus, in asking whether a particular type of cost "would
not have been incurred" if the property were held by an
individual, § 67(e)(1) excepts from the 2% floor only those costs
that it would be uncommon (or unusual, or unlikely) for such a
hypothetical individual to incur.'49

142. See id. at 789 ("The [t]rustee's reading is further undermined by our inclination, [i]n
construing provisions .. in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, [to] read
the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision." (quoting Comm'r
v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. See id.
at 788. A trustee cannot comply with the trustee's fiduciary duty if the trustee incurs
an expense that is not reasonably necessary. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
144. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 789.
145. See id.at790-91.
146. See id.
147. Id. at790 91.
148. See id.at 788 89 ("[W]e see no difference in saying, on the one hand, that costs are 'caused
by' the fact that the property is held in trust
and, on the other, that costs are incurred 'in
connection with
the administration' of the trust.").
149. Id.at 789 90.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 8

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 551

The Court found that the dictionary meaning of "would" is understood here as
"express[ing] concepts such as custom, habit, natural disposition, or probability."' 50
Applying this interpretation, the Court noted that "it is not uncommon or unusual"
for individual investors to incur investment advisory fees.' 5 ' Because nothing
indicated that the investment advisor to the Rudkin Trust "charged the [t]rustee
anything extra, or treated the [t]rust any differently than it would have treated an
individual with similar objectives, because of the [t]rustee's fiduciary obligations,"
the investment advisory52 fees were not "distinctive" and were therefore subject to
the two-percent floor. 1
The standard articulated by the Court will at times require a case-by-case
analysis of the investment advisory fees incurred by a particular trust in order to
determine if those costs meet the second prong of § 67(e)(1). For example, if a trust
has an "unusual investment objective" or necessitates "a specialized balancing of
the interest of various parties," then to the extent that the trust incurred investment
advisory fees for these unique purposes, such fees would meet the second prong of
§ 67(e)(1).153 Another example of a fee that would be exempt from the two-percent
floor is an additional fee that is only charged to fiduciary accounts. 154 These special
or unique circumstances may warrant individualized examination of a trust, and
corporate trustees may read this opinion and then characterize fees for investment
advice as being charged for the unique needs of the fiduciary account.
One troubling aspect of the Federal and Fourth Circuit's decisions revealed
during the oral argument in Knight is that the test depends on whether people
commonly or customarily incur investment advisory fees for a property of a
particular size. 155 Chief Justice Roberts asked Mr. Miller,
[H]ow many individuals do you need [in order for a cost to be
considered customarily incurred]? Let's say it's $3 million in the
trust, and we think maybe [sixty] percent of people would hire an
investment advisor; [forty] percent would think they can do just
as well on156 their own. Is that customarily incurred by
individuals?

150. Id. at 789 (quoting Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2003)) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 790.
152. Id. at 791.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 19. Counsel for the trust criticized the
commonly or customarily incurred test because of the "imponderables" that it presents: "What is usually
done? Do trusts of different sizes have different rules? When a trust's assets come below a certain point,
what about that?" Id.
156. Id. at39-40. Mr. Miller responded by stating that the IRS could clarify this through
regulations. Id.at 40, 44.
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Justice Stevens said that this case-by-case analysis is "the most51 normal
reading of
7
the language [and is] probably the most unwise reading, also.'
This problem of uncertainty is also inherent in the test articulated by the
Supreme Court: whether a cost would be uncommon for a hypothetical investor to
incur. The Supreme Court failed to address the question of whether the size of the
trust or estate influences the outcome under the standard it articulated. In other
words, is it uncommon or unusual for a hypothetical investor to incur investment
advisory fees similar to a trust of this particular size? The Chief Justice conceded
inthe opinion, particularly given the absence of regulatory guidance, that this could
present itself as a nebulous standard in some cases; however, he refused to depart
from the language of the statute-as both parties had done-simply to achieve ease
of administration.'58 Chief Justice Roberts declared, "Congress's decision to phrase
the pertinent inquiry in terms of a prediction about a hypothetical situation
inevitably entails some uncertainty, but that is no excuse for judicial amendment
159
of the statute.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's interpretation, although not without its problems, is the
only interpretation that will give full effect to the language of the statute.
Legislative history is unclear. In some ways it supports the taxpayer's contentions
as to congressional intent, such as by intending that § 67(e) avoid deductions
through pass-through entities. However, the legislative history, particularly the
goals of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, tends to more strongly support the
government's position. If Congress intended to allow investment advisory fees to
be fully deductible, it could have addressed these expenses directly. There is no
mention of these expenses in the legislative history. The statutory language requires
that any expenses incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or
trust be taxed in the same manner as an individual unless it would not have been
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate. Investment advisory
fees are regularly incurred by individuals, thus failing to satisfy the second prong
of § 67(e)(1). Therefore, in order to tax the estate in the same manner as an
individual with regard to investment advisory fees, these fees must be subject to the
two-percent floor imposed under § 67(a). Although this standard may not be a
certain, bright-line rule-which is preferred in the tax code-that is the language
Congress chose to use, and only Congress can rewrite the law.
Sarah S. Batson

157. Id. at 17.
158. See Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 791.
159. Id.
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